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man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he `
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deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid `
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flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his `
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pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to `
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discover if possible something--at all events "new faculties"--of `
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which to be still prouder!--But let us reflect for a moment--it `
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is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori `
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POSSIBLE?" Kant asks himself--and what is really his answer? "BY `
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MEANS OF A MEANS (faculty)"--but unfortunately not in five words, `
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but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of `
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German profundity and verbal flourishes, that one altogether `
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loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such `
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an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this `
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new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant `
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further discovered a moral faculty in man--for at that time `
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Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the "Politics of `
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hard fact." Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the `
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young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately `
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into the groves--all seeking for "faculties." And what did they `
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not find--in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of `
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the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, `
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piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between `
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"finding" and "inventing"! Above all a faculty for the `
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"transcendental"; Schelling christened it, intellectual `
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intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the `
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naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to `
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the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was `
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really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so `
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boldly, in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it `
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seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, `
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however--the world grew older, and the dream vanished. A time `
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came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them `
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today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost--old `
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Kant. "By means of a means (faculty)"--he had said, or at least `
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meant to say. But, is that--an answer? An explanation? Or is it `
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not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium `
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induce sleep? "By means of a means (faculty), "namely the virtus `
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dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere, `
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Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva, `
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Cujus est natura sensus assoupire. `
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But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high `
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time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic `
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judgments a PRIORI possible?" by another question, "Why is belief `
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in such judgments necessary?"--in effect, it is high time that we `
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should understand that such judgments must be believed to be `
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true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like `
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ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! `
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Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily--synthetic `
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judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all; we have no `
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right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false `
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judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is `
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necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence belonging to `
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the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the `
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enormous influence which "German philosophy"--I hope you `
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understand its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)?--has `
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exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that `
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a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA had a share in it; thanks to German `
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philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, `
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the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians, and the `
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political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to `
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the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last `
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century into this, in short--"sensus assoupire." . . . `
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12. As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best- `
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refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is `
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now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to `
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attach serious signification to it, except for convenient `
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everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)-- `
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thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus `
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have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of `
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ocular evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to `
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believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does NOT `
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stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the `
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last thing that "stood fast" of the earth--the belief in `
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"substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle- `
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atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has `
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hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still `
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further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, `
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against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous `
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after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more `
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celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all `
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give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous `
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atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL- `
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ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the `
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belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, `
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eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought `
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to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all `
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necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one `
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of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens `
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frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch `
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on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open `
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for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and `
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such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective `
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multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and `
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passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. `
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In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the `
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superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical `
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luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, `
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thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust--it is `
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possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more `
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comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that `
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precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT--and, who knows? `
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perhaps to DISCOVER the new. `
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13. Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down `
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the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an `
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organic being. A living thing seeks above all to DISCHARGE its `
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strength--life itself is WILL TO POWER; self-preservation is only `
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one of the indirect and most frequent RESULTS thereof. In short, `
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here, as everywhere else, let us beware of SUPERFLUOUS `
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teleological principles!--one of which is the instinct of self- `
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preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, `
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in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy `
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of principles. `
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14. It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural `
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philosophy is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement `
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(according to us, if I may say so!) and NOT a world-explanation; `
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but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is `
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regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as `
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more--namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its `
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own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this `
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operates fascinatingly, persuasively, and CONVINCINGLY upon an `
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age with fundamentally plebeian tastes--in fact, it follows `
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instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular sensualism. `
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What is clear, what is "explained"? Only that which can be seen `
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and felt--one must pursue every problem thus far. Obversely, `
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however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which was an `
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ARISTOCRATIC mode, consisted precisely in RESISTANCE to obvious `
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sense-evidence--perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and `
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more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how `
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to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this `
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by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they `
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threw over the motley whirl of the senses--the mob of the senses, `
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as Plato said. In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting `
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of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an ENJOYMENT `
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different from that which the physicists of today offer us--and `
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likewise the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the `
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physiological workers, with their principle of the "smallest `
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possible effort," and the greatest possible blunder. "Where there `
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is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more `
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for men to do"--that is certainly an imperative different from `
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the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right `
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imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridge- `
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builders of the future, who have nothing but ROUGH work to `
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perform. `
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15. To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist `
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on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense `
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of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be `
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causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, `
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if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the `
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external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a `
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part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But `
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then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It `
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seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, if the `
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conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally absurd. `
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Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs--? `
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16. There are still harmless self-observers who believe that `
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there are "immediate certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as `
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the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though `
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cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the `
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thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either `
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on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, `
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however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as `
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"absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a `
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CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from `
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the misleading significance of words! The people on their part `
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may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the `
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philosopher must say to himself: "When I analyze the process that `
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is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of `
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daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be `
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difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is _I_ who `
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think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that `
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thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who `
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is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, `
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that it is already determined what is to be designated by `
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thinking--that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already `
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decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I `
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determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps `
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'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' `
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assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present moment with other `
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states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; `
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on account of this retrospective connection with further `
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'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for `
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me."--In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people `
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may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a `
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series of metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable `
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conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: "Whence did I get `
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the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? `
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What gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an `
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'ego' as cause, and finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?" He `
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who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an `
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appeal to a sort of INTUITIVE perception, like the person who `
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says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, `
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and certain"--will encounter a smile and two notes of `
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interrogation in a philosopher nowadays. "Sir," the philosopher `
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will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you `
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