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will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you `
`
are not mistaken, but why should it be the truth?" `
`
`
`
17. With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never `
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tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly `
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recognized by these credulous minds--namely, that a thought comes `
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when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a `
`
PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" `
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is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that `
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this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it `
`
mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an `
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"immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with `
`
this "one thinks"--even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of `
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the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One `
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infers here according to the usual grammatical formula--"To think `
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is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; `
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consequently" . . . It was pretty much on the same lines that the `
`
older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material `
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particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates--the `
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atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along `
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without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall `
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accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to `
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get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" `
`
has refined itself). `
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`
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18. It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is `
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refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more `
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subtle minds. It seems that the hundred-times-refuted theory of `
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the "free will" owes its persistence to this charm alone; some `
`
one is always appearing who feels himself strong enough to refute `
`
it. `
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`
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19. Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it `
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were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has `
`
given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, `
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absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. `
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But it again and again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer `
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also only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing-he `
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seems to have adopted a POPULAR PREJUDICE and exaggerated it. `
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Willing-seems to me to be above all something COMPLICATED, `
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something that is a unity only in name--and it is precisely in a `
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name that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the mastery over `
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the inadequate precautions of philosophers in all ages. So let us `
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for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let us `
`
say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of `
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sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM `
`
WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we `
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go," the sensation of this "FROM" and "TOWARDS" itself, and then `
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besides, an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without `
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our putting in motion "arms and legs," commences its action by `
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force of habit, directly we "will" anything. Therefore, just as `
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sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be `
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recognized as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, `
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thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the will there `
`
is a ruling thought;--and let us not imagine it possible to sever `
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this thought from the "willing," as if the will would then remain `
`
over! In the third place, the will is not only a complex of `
`
sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in `
`
fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed "freedom of `
`
the will" is essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to `
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him who must obey: "I am free, 'he' must obey"--this `
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consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the `
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straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself `
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exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this `
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and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that `
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obedience will be rendered--and whatever else pertains to the `
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position of the commander. A man who WILLS commands something `
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within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes `
`
renders obedience. But now let us notice what is the strangest `
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thing about the will,--this affair so extremely complex, for `
`
which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the given `
`
circumstances we are at the same time the commanding AND the `
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obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations `
`
of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which `
`
usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, `
`
on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, `
`
and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term `
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"I": a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of `
`
false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the `
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act of willing--to such a degree that he who wills believes `
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firmly that willing SUFFICES for action. Since in the majority of `
`
cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the `
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command--consequently obedience, and therefore action--was to be `
`
EXPECTED, the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the `
`
sentiment, as if there were a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he `
`
who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and `
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action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out `
`
of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an `
`
increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success. `
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"Freedom of Will"--that is the expression for the complex state `
`
of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at `
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the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order-- `
`
who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks `
`
within himself that it was really his own will that overcame `
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them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the `
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feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the `
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useful "underwills" or under-souls--indeed, our body is but a `
`
social structure composed of many souls--to his feelings of `
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delight as commander. L'EFFET C'EST MOI. what happens here is `
`
what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, `
`
namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the `
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successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a `
`
question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already `
`
said, of a social structure composed of many "souls", on which `
`
account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing- `
`
as-such within the sphere of morals--regarded as the doctrine of `
`
the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life" `
`
manifests itself. `
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`
`
20. That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything `
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optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and `
`
relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and `
`
arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they `
`
nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective `
`
members of the fauna of a Continent--is betrayed in the end by `
`
the circumstance: how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers `
`
always fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of POSSIBLE `
`
philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once `
`
more in the same orbit, however independent of each other they `
`
may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, `
`
something within them leads them, something impels them in `
`
definite order the one after the other--to wit, the innate `
`
methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is, `
`
in fact, far less a discovery than a re-recognizing, a `
`
remembering, a return and a home-coming to a far-off, ancient `
`
common-household of the soul, out of which those ideas formerly `
`
grew: philosophizing is so far a kind of atavism of the highest `
`
order. The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and `
`
German philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where `
`
there is affinity of language, owing to the common philosophy of `
`
grammar--I mean owing to the unconscious domination and guidance `
`
of similar grammatical functions--it cannot but be that `
`
everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development `
`
and succession of philosophical systems, just as the way seems `
`
barred against certain other possibilities of world- `
`
interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within `
`
the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where the conception of `
`
the subject is least developed) look otherwise "into the world," `
`
and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the `
`
Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain grammatical `
`
functions is ultimately also the spell of PHYSIOLOGICAL `
`
valuations and racial conditions.--So much by way of rejecting `
`
Locke's superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas. `
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`
`
21. The CAUSA SUI is the best self-contradiction that has yet `
`
been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and `
`
unnaturalness; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to `
`
entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly. `
`
The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical `
`
sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of `
`
the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate `
`
responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the `
`
world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing `
`
less than to be precisely this CAUSA SUI, and, with more than `
`
Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, `
`
out of the slough of nothingness. If any one should find out in `
`
this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of `
`
"free will" and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him `
`
to carry his "enlightenment" a step further, and also put out of `
`
his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of "free `
`
will": I mean "non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse of `
`
cause and effect. One should not wrongly MATERIALISE "cause" and `
`
"effect," as the natural philosophers do (and whoever like them `
`
naturalize in thinking at present), according to the prevailing `
`
mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until `
`
it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as `
`
pure CONCEPTIONS, that is to say, as conventional fictions for `
`
the purpose of designation and mutual understanding,--NOT for `
`
explanation. In "being-in-itself" there is nothing of "casual- `
`
connection," of "necessity," or of "psychological non-freedom"; `
`
there the effect does NOT follow the cause, there "law" does not `
`
obtain. It is WE alone who have devised cause, sequence, `
`
reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, `
`
motive, and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this `
`
symbol-world, as "being-in-itself," with things, we act once more `
`
as we have always acted--MYTHOLOGICALLY. The "non-free will" is `
`
mythology; in real life it is only a question of STRONG and WEAK `
`
wills.--It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in `
`
himself, when a thinker, in every "causal-connection" and `
`
"psychological necessity," manifests something of compulsion, `
`
indigence, obsequiousness, oppression, and non-freedom; it is `
`
suspicious to have such feelings--the person betrays himself. And `
`
in general, if I have observed correctly, the "non-freedom of the `
`
will" is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite `
`
standpoints, but always in a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some `
`
will not give up their "responsibility," their belief in `
`
THEMSELVES, the personal right to THEIR merits, at any price (the `
`
vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not `
`
wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and `
`
owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE `
`
BUSINESS, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are `
`
in the habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort `
`
of socialistic sympathy is their favourite disguise. And as a `
`
matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak-willed embellishes `
`
itself surprisingly when it can pose as "la religion de la `
`
souffrance humaine"; that is ITS "good taste." `
`
`
`
22. Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist `
`
from the mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of `
`
interpretation, but "Nature's conformity to law," of which you `
`
physicists talk so proudly, as though--why, it exists only owing `
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