Reading Help Beyond good and evil
what is most difficult to us.--Concerning the origin of many `
` systems of morals. `
` `
` 144. When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally `
` something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself `
` conduces to a certain virility of taste; man, indeed, if I may `
` say so, is "the barren animal." `
` `
` 145. Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman `
` would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the `
` instinct for the SECONDARY role. `
` `
` 146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he `
` thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, `
` the abyss will also gaze into thee. `
` `
` 147. From old Florentine novels--moreover, from life: Buona `
` femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone.--Sacchetti, Nov. 86. `
` `
` 148. To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and `
` afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion of their `
` neighbour--who can do this conjuring trick so well as women? `
` `
` 149. That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable `
` echo of what was formerly considered good--the atavism of an old `
` ideal. `
` `
` 150. Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the `
` demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God `
` everything becomes--what? perhaps a "world"? `
` `
` 151. It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have `
` your permission to possess it;--eh, my friends? `
` `
` 152. "Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always `
` Paradise": so say the most ancient and the most modern serpents. `
` `
` 153. What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and `
` evil. `
` `
` 154. Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are `
` signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology. `
` `
` 155. The sense of the tragic increases and declines with `
` sensuousness. `
` `
` 156. Insanity in individuals is something rare--but in groups, `
` parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule. `
` `
` 157. The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of `
` it one gets successfully through many a bad night. `
` `
` 158. Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to `
` our strongest impulse--the tyrant in us. `
` `
` 159. One MUST repay good and ill; but why just to the person who `
` did us good or ill? `
` `
` 160. One no longer loves one's knowledge sufficiently after one `
` has communicated it. `
` `
` 161. Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences: they `
` exploit them. `
` `
` 162. "Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our `
` neighbour's neighbour":--so thinks every nation. `
` `
` 163. Love brings to light the noble and hidden qualities of a `
` lover--his rare and exceptional traits: it is thus liable to be `
` deceptive as to his normal character. `
` `
` 164. Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants;--love God `
` as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with `
` morals!" `
` `
` 165. IN SIGHT OF EVERY PARTY.--A shepherd has always need of a `
` bell-wether--or he has himself to be a wether occasionally. `
` `
` 166. One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with the accompanying `
` grimace one nevertheless tells the truth. `
` `
` 167. To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame--and something `
` precious. `
` `
` 168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of `
` it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice. `
` `
` 169. To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing `
` oneself. `
` `
` 170. In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in blame. `
` `
` 171. Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of knowledge, `
` like tender hands on a Cyclops. `
` `
` 172. One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to `
` mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one `
` must never confess to the individual. `
` `
` 173. One does not hate as long as one disesteems, but only when `
` one esteems equal or superior. `
` `
` 174. Ye Utilitarians--ye, too, love the UTILE only as a VEHICLE `
` for your inclinations,--ye, too, really find the noise of its `
` wheels insupportable! `
` `
` 175. One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired. `
` `
` 176. The vanity of others is only counter to our taste when it is `
` counter to our vanity. `
` `
` 177. With regard to what "truthfulness" is, perhaps nobody has `
` ever been sufficiently truthful. `
` `
` 178. One does not believe in the follies of clever men: what a `
` forfeiture of the rights of man! `
` `
` 179. The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, `
` very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile "reformed." `
` `
` 180. There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good `
` faith in a cause. `
` `
` 181. It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed. `
` `
` 182. The familiarity of superiors embitters one, because it may `
` not be returned. `
` `
` 183. "I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but `
` because I can no longer believe in you." `
` `
` 184. There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the appearance `
` of wickedness. `
` `
` 185. "I dislike him."--Why?--"I am not a match for him."--Did any `
` one ever answer so? `
` `
` `
` CHAPTER V `
` `
` THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS `
` `
` `
` 186. The moral sentiment in Europe at present is perhaps as `
` subtle, belated, diverse, sensitive, and refined, as the "Science `
` of Morals" belonging thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and `
` coarse-fingered:--an interesting contrast, which sometimes `
` becomes incarnate and obvious in the very person of a moralist. `
` Indeed, the expression, "Science of Morals" is, in respect to `
` what is designated thereby, far too presumptuous and counter to `
` GOOD taste,--which is always a foretaste of more modest `
` expressions. One ought to avow with the utmost fairness WHAT is `
` still necessary here for a long time, WHAT is alone proper for `
` the present: namely, the collection of material, the `
` comprehensive survey and classification of an immense domain of `
` delicate sentiments of worth, and distinctions of worth, which `
` live, grow, propagate, and perish--and perhaps attempts to give a `
` clear idea of the recurring and more common forms of these living `
` crystallizations--as preparation for a THEORY OF TYPES of `
` morality. To be sure, people have not hitherto been so modest. `
` All the philosophers, with a pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, `
` demanded of themselves something very much higher, more `
` pretentious, and ceremonious, when they concerned themselves with `
` morality as a science: they wanted to GIVE A BASIC to morality-- `
` and every philosopher hitherto has believed that he has given it `
` a basis; morality itself, however, has been regarded as something `
` "given." How far from their awkward pride was the seemingly `
` insignificant problem--left in dust and decay--of a description `
` of forms of morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and `
` senses could hardly be fine enough for it! It was precisely owing `
` to moral philosophers' knowing the moral facts imperfectly, in an `
` arbitrary epitome, or an accidental abridgement--perhaps as the `
` morality of their environment, their position, their church, `
` their Zeitgeist, their climate and zone--it was precisely because `
` they were badly instructed with regard to nations, eras, and past `
` ages, and were by no means eager to know about these matters, `
` that they did not even come in sight of the real problems of `
` morals--problems which only disclose themselves by a comparison `
` of MANY kinds of morality. In every "Science of Morals" hitherto, `
` strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has been `
` OMITTED: there has been no suspicion that there was anything `
` problematic there! That which philosophers called "giving a basis `
` to morality," and endeavoured to realize, has, when seen in a `
` right light, proved merely a learned form of good FAITH in `
` prevailing morality, a new means of its EXPRESSION, consequently `
` just a matter-of-fact within the sphere of a definite morality, `
` yea, in its ultimate motive, a sort of denial that it is LAWFUL `
` for this morality to be called in question--and in any case the `
` reverse of the testing, analyzing, doubting, and vivisecting of `
` this very faith. Hear, for instance, with what innocence--almost `
` worthy of honour--Schopenhauer represents his own task, and draw `
` your conclusions concerning the scientificness of a "Science" `
` whose latest master still talks in the strain of children and old `
` wives: "The principle," he says (page 136 of the Grundprobleme `
` der Ethik), [Footnote: Pages 54-55 of Schopenhauer's Basis of `
` Morality, translated by Arthur B. Bullock, M.A. (1903).] "the `
` axiom about the purport of which all moralists are PRACTICALLY `
` agreed: neminem laede, immo omnes quantum potes juva--is REALLY `
` the proposition which all moral teachers strive to establish, `
` . . . the REAL basis of ethics which has been sought, like `
` the philosopher's stone, for centuries."--The difficulty of `
`
` systems of morals. `
` `
` 144. When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally `
` something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself `
` conduces to a certain virility of taste; man, indeed, if I may `
` say so, is "the barren animal." `
` `
` 145. Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman `
` would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the `
` instinct for the SECONDARY role. `
` `
` 146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he `
` thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, `
` the abyss will also gaze into thee. `
` `
` 147. From old Florentine novels--moreover, from life: Buona `
` femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone.--Sacchetti, Nov. 86. `
` `
` 148. To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and `
` afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion of their `
` neighbour--who can do this conjuring trick so well as women? `
` `
` 149. That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable `
` echo of what was formerly considered good--the atavism of an old `
` ideal. `
` `
` 150. Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the `
` demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God `
` everything becomes--what? perhaps a "world"? `
` `
` 151. It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have `
` your permission to possess it;--eh, my friends? `
` `
` 152. "Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always `
` Paradise": so say the most ancient and the most modern serpents. `
` `
` 153. What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and `
` evil. `
` `
` 154. Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are `
` signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology. `
` `
` 155. The sense of the tragic increases and declines with `
` sensuousness. `
` `
` 156. Insanity in individuals is something rare--but in groups, `
` parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule. `
` `
` 157. The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of `
` it one gets successfully through many a bad night. `
` `
` 158. Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to `
` our strongest impulse--the tyrant in us. `
` `
` 159. One MUST repay good and ill; but why just to the person who `
` did us good or ill? `
` `
` 160. One no longer loves one's knowledge sufficiently after one `
` has communicated it. `
` `
` 161. Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences: they `
` exploit them. `
` `
` 162. "Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our `
` neighbour's neighbour":--so thinks every nation. `
` `
` 163. Love brings to light the noble and hidden qualities of a `
` lover--his rare and exceptional traits: it is thus liable to be `
` deceptive as to his normal character. `
` `
` 164. Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants;--love God `
` as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with `
` morals!" `
` `
` 165. IN SIGHT OF EVERY PARTY.--A shepherd has always need of a `
` bell-wether--or he has himself to be a wether occasionally. `
` `
` 166. One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with the accompanying `
` grimace one nevertheless tells the truth. `
` `
` 167. To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame--and something `
` precious. `
` `
` 168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of `
` it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice. `
` `
` 169. To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing `
` oneself. `
` `
` 170. In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in blame. `
` `
` 171. Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of knowledge, `
` like tender hands on a Cyclops. `
` `
` 172. One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to `
` mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one `
` must never confess to the individual. `
` `
` 173. One does not hate as long as one disesteems, but only when `
` one esteems equal or superior. `
` `
` 174. Ye Utilitarians--ye, too, love the UTILE only as a VEHICLE `
` for your inclinations,--ye, too, really find the noise of its `
` wheels insupportable! `
` `
` 175. One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired. `
` `
` 176. The vanity of others is only counter to our taste when it is `
` counter to our vanity. `
` `
` 177. With regard to what "truthfulness" is, perhaps nobody has `
` ever been sufficiently truthful. `
` `
` 178. One does not believe in the follies of clever men: what a `
` forfeiture of the rights of man! `
` `
` 179. The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, `
` very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile "reformed." `
` `
` 180. There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good `
` faith in a cause. `
` `
` 181. It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed. `
` `
` 182. The familiarity of superiors embitters one, because it may `
` not be returned. `
` `
` 183. "I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but `
` because I can no longer believe in you." `
` `
` 184. There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the appearance `
` of wickedness. `
` `
` 185. "I dislike him."--Why?--"I am not a match for him."--Did any `
` one ever answer so? `
` `
` `
` CHAPTER V `
` `
` THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS `
` `
` `
` 186. The moral sentiment in Europe at present is perhaps as `
` subtle, belated, diverse, sensitive, and refined, as the "Science `
` of Morals" belonging thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and `
` coarse-fingered:--an interesting contrast, which sometimes `
` becomes incarnate and obvious in the very person of a moralist. `
` Indeed, the expression, "Science of Morals" is, in respect to `
` what is designated thereby, far too presumptuous and counter to `
` GOOD taste,--which is always a foretaste of more modest `
` expressions. One ought to avow with the utmost fairness WHAT is `
` still necessary here for a long time, WHAT is alone proper for `
` the present: namely, the collection of material, the `
` comprehensive survey and classification of an immense domain of `
` delicate sentiments of worth, and distinctions of worth, which `
` live, grow, propagate, and perish--and perhaps attempts to give a `
` clear idea of the recurring and more common forms of these living `
` crystallizations--as preparation for a THEORY OF TYPES of `
` morality. To be sure, people have not hitherto been so modest. `
` All the philosophers, with a pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, `
` demanded of themselves something very much higher, more `
` pretentious, and ceremonious, when they concerned themselves with `
` morality as a science: they wanted to GIVE A BASIC to morality-- `
` and every philosopher hitherto has believed that he has given it `
` a basis; morality itself, however, has been regarded as something `
` "given." How far from their awkward pride was the seemingly `
` insignificant problem--left in dust and decay--of a description `
` of forms of morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and `
` senses could hardly be fine enough for it! It was precisely owing `
` to moral philosophers' knowing the moral facts imperfectly, in an `
` arbitrary epitome, or an accidental abridgement--perhaps as the `
` morality of their environment, their position, their church, `
` their Zeitgeist, their climate and zone--it was precisely because `
` they were badly instructed with regard to nations, eras, and past `
` ages, and were by no means eager to know about these matters, `
` that they did not even come in sight of the real problems of `
` morals--problems which only disclose themselves by a comparison `
` of MANY kinds of morality. In every "Science of Morals" hitherto, `
` strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has been `
` OMITTED: there has been no suspicion that there was anything `
` problematic there! That which philosophers called "giving a basis `
` to morality," and endeavoured to realize, has, when seen in a `
` right light, proved merely a learned form of good FAITH in `
` prevailing morality, a new means of its EXPRESSION, consequently `
` just a matter-of-fact within the sphere of a definite morality, `
` yea, in its ultimate motive, a sort of denial that it is LAWFUL `
` for this morality to be called in question--and in any case the `
` reverse of the testing, analyzing, doubting, and vivisecting of `
` this very faith. Hear, for instance, with what innocence--almost `
` worthy of honour--Schopenhauer represents his own task, and draw `
` your conclusions concerning the scientificness of a "Science" `
` whose latest master still talks in the strain of children and old `
` wives: "The principle," he says (page 136 of the Grundprobleme `
` der Ethik), [Footnote: Pages 54-55 of Schopenhauer's Basis of `
` Morality, translated by Arthur B. Bullock, M.A. (1903).] "the `
` axiom about the purport of which all moralists are PRACTICALLY `
` agreed: neminem laede, immo omnes quantum potes juva--is REALLY `
` the proposition which all moral teachers strive to establish, `
` . . . the REAL basis of ethics which has been sought, like `
` the philosopher's stone, for centuries."--The difficulty of `
`