Reading Help Beyond good and evil
the philosopher's stone, for centuries."--The difficulty of `
` establishing the proposition referred to may indeed be great--it `
` is well known that Schopenhauer also was unsuccessful in his `
` efforts; and whoever has thoroughly realized how absurdly false `
` and sentimental this proposition is, in a world whose essence is `
` Will to Power, may be reminded that Schopenhauer, although a `
` pessimist, ACTUALLY--played the flute . . . daily after dinner: `
` one may read about the matter in his biography. A question by the `
` way: a pessimist, a repudiator of God and of the world, who MAKES `
` A HALT at morality--who assents to morality, and plays the flute `
` to laede-neminem morals, what? Is that really--a pessimist? `
` `
` 187. Apart from the value of such assertions as "there is a `
` categorical imperative in us," one can always ask: What does such `
` an assertion indicate about him who makes it? There are systems `
` of morals which are meant to justify their author in the eyes of `
` other people; other systems of morals are meant to tranquilize `
` him, and make him self-satisfied; with other systems he wants to `
` crucify and humble himself, with others he wishes to take revenge, `
` with others to conceal himself, with others to glorify himself and `
` gave superiority and distinction,--this system of morals helps its `
` author to forget, that system makes him, or something of him, `
` forgotten, many a moralist would like to exercise power and `
` creative arbitrariness over mankind, many another, perhaps, Kant `
` especially, gives us to understand by his morals that "what is `
` estimable in me, is that I know how to obey--and with you it SHALL `
` not be otherwise than with me!" In short, systems of morals are `
` only a SIGN-LANGUAGE OF THE EMOTIONS. `
` `
` 188. In contrast to laisser-aller, every system of morals is a `
` sort of tyranny against "nature" and also against "reason", that `
` is, however, no objection, unless one should again decree by some `
` system of morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness `
` are unlawful What is essential and invaluable in every system of `
` morals, is that it is a long constraint. In order to understand `
` Stoicism, or Port Royal, or Puritanism, one should remember the `
` constraint under which every language has attained to strength `
` and freedom--the metrical constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and `
` rhythm. How much trouble have the poets and orators of every `
` nation given themselves!--not excepting some of the prose writers `
` of today, in whose ear dwells an inexorable conscientiousness-- `
` "for the sake of a folly," as utilitarian bunglers say, and `
` thereby deem themselves wise--"from submission to arbitrary `
` laws," as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy themselves `
` "free," even free-spirited. The singular fact remains, however, `
` that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, `
` dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, `
` whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in `
` speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only `
` developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law, and in `
` all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this `
` is "nature" and "natural"--and not laisser-aller! Every artist `
` knows how different from the state of letting himself go, is his `
` "most natural" condition, the free arranging, locating, `
` disposing, and constructing in the moments of "inspiration"--and `
` how strictly and delicately he then obeys a thousand laws, which, `
` by their very rigidness and precision, defy all formulation by `
` means of ideas (even the most stable idea has, in comparison `
` therewith, something floating, manifold, and ambiguous in it). `
` The essential thing "in heaven and in earth" is, apparently (to `
` repeat it once more), that there should be long OBEDIENCE in the `
` same direction, there thereby results, and has always resulted in `
` the long run, something which has made life worth living; for `
` instance, virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality-- `
` anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish, or `
` divine. The long bondage of the spirit, the distrustful `
` constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which `
` the thinker imposed on himself to think in accordance with the `
` rules of a church or a court, or conformable to Aristotelian `
` premises, the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything `
` that happened according to a Christian scheme, and in every `
` occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God:--all this `
` violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness, and `
` unreasonableness, has proved itself the disciplinary means `
` whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its `
` remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility; granted also that much `
` irrecoverable strength and spirit had to be stifled, suffocated, `
` and spoilt in the process (for here, as everywhere, "nature" `
` shows herself as she is, in all her extravagant and INDIFFERENT `
` magnificence, which is shocking, but nevertheless noble). That `
` for centuries European thinkers only thought in order to prove `
` something-nowadays, on the contrary, we are suspicious of every `
` thinker who "wishes to prove something"--that it was always `
` settled beforehand what WAS TO BE the result of their strictest `
` thinking, as it was perhaps in the Asiatic astrology of former `
` times, or as it is still at the present day in the innocent, `
` Christian-moral explanation of immediate personal events "for the `
` glory of God," or "for the good of the soul":--this tyranny, this `
` arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has `
` EDUCATED the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer `
` sense, is apparently an indispensable means even of spiritual `
` education and discipline. One may look at every system of morals `
` in this light: it is "nature" therein which teaches to hate the `
` laisser-aller, the too great freedom, and implants the need for `
` limited horizons, for immediate duties--it teaches the NARROWING `
` OF PERSPECTIVES, and thus, in a certain sense, that stupidity is `
` a condition of life and development. "Thou must obey some one, `
` and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief, and lose `
` all respect for thyself"--this seems to me to be the moral `
` imperative of nature, which is certainly neither "categorical," `
` as old Kant wished (consequently the "otherwise"), nor does it `
` address itself to the individual (what does nature care for the `
` individual!), but to nations, races, ages, and ranks; above all, `
` however, to the animal "man" generally, to MANKIND. `
` `
` 189. Industrious races find it a great hardship to be idle: it `
` was a master stroke of ENGLISH instinct to hallow and begloom `
` Sunday to such an extent that the Englishman unconsciously `
` hankers for his week--and work-day again:--as a kind of cleverly `
` devised, cleverly intercalated FAST, such as is also frequently `
` found in the ancient world (although, as is appropriate in `
` southern nations, not precisely with respect to work). Many kinds `
` of fasts are necessary; and wherever powerful influences and `
` habits prevail, legislators have to see that intercalary days are `
` appointed, on which such impulses are fettered, and learn to `
` hunger anew. Viewed from a higher standpoint, whole generations `
` and epochs, when they show themselves infected with any moral `
` fanaticism, seem like those intercalated periods of restraint and `
` fasting, during which an impulse learns to humble and submit `
` itself--at the same time also to PURIFY and SHARPEN itself; `
` certain philosophical sects likewise admit of a similar `
` interpretation (for instance, the Stoa, in the midst of Hellenic `
` culture, with the atmosphere rank and overcharged with `
` Aphrodisiacal odours).--Here also is a hint for the explanation `
` of the paradox, why it was precisely in the most Christian period `
` of European history, and in general only under the pressure of `
` Christian sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated into `
` love (amour-passion). `
` `
` 190. There is something in the morality of Plato which does not `
` really belong to Plato, but which only appears in his philosophy, `
` one might say, in spite of him: namely, Socratism, for which he `
` himself was too noble. "No one desires to injure himself, hence `
` all evil is done unwittingly. The evil man inflicts injury on `
` himself; he would not do so, however, if he knew that evil is `
` evil. The evil man, therefore, is only evil through error; if one `
` free him from error one will necessarily make him--good."--This `
` mode of reasoning savours of the POPULACE, who perceive only the `
` unpleasant consequences of evil-doing, and practically judge that `
` "it is STUPID to do wrong"; while they accept "good" as identical `
` with "useful and pleasant," without further thought. As regards `
` every system of utilitarianism, one may at once assume that it `
` has the same origin, and follow the scent: one will seldom err.-- `
` Plato did all he could to interpret something refined and noble `
` into the tenets of his teacher, and above all to interpret `
` himself into them--he, the most daring of all interpreters, who `
` lifted the entire Socrates out of the street, as a popular theme `
` and song, to exhibit him in endless and impossible modifications `
` --namely, in all his own disguises and multiplicities. In jest, `
` and in Homeric language as well, what is the Platonic Socrates, `
` if not-- [Greek words inserted here.] `
` `
` 191. The old theological problem of "Faith" and "Knowledge," or `
` more plainly, of instinct and reason--the question whether, in `
` respect to the valuation of things, instinct deserves more `
` authority than rationality, which wants to appreciate and act `
` according to motives, according to a "Why," that is to say, in `
` conformity to purpose and utility--it is always the old moral `
` problem that first appeared in the person of Socrates, and had `
` divided men's minds long before Christianity. Socrates himself, `
` following, of course, the taste of his talent--that of a `
` surpassing dialectician--took first the side of reason; and, in `
` fact, what did he do all his life but laugh at the awkward `
` incapacity of the noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like `
` all noble men, and could never give satisfactory answers `
` concerning the motives of their actions? In the end, however, `
` though silently and secretly, he laughed also at himself: with `
` his finer conscience and introspection, he found in himself the `
` same difficulty and incapacity. "But why"--he said to himself-- `
` "should one on that account separate oneself from the instincts! `
` One must set them right, and the reason ALSO--one must follow the `
` instincts, but at the same time persuade the reason to support `
` them with good arguments." This was the real FALSENESS of that `
` great and mysterious ironist; he brought his conscience up to the `
` point that he was satisfied with a kind of self-outwitting: in `
` fact, he perceived the irrationality in the moral judgment.-- `
` Plato, more innocent in such matters, and without the craftiness `
` of the plebeian, wished to prove to himself, at the expenditure `
` of all his strength--the greatest strength a philosopher had ever `
` expended--that reason and instinct lead spontaneously to one `
` goal, to the good, to "God"; and since Plato, all theologians and `
` philosophers have followed the same path--which means that in `
` matters of morality, instinct (or as Christians call it, "Faith," `
` or as I call it, "the herd") has hitherto triumphed. Unless one `
` should make an exception in the case of Descartes, the father of `
` rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), `
` who recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only a `
` tool, and Descartes was superficial. `
` `
` 192. Whoever has followed the history of a single science, finds `
` in its development a clue to the understanding of the oldest and `
` commonest processes of all "knowledge and cognizance": there, as `
` here, the premature hypotheses, the fictions, the good stupid `
` will to "belief," and the lack of distrust and patience are first `
` developed--our senses learn late, and never learn completely, to `
` be subtle, reliable, and cautious organs of knowledge. Our eyes `
` find it easier on a given occasion to produce a picture already `
` often produced, than to seize upon the divergence and novelty of `
` an impression: the latter requires more force, more "morality." `
` It is difficult and painful for the ear to listen to anything `
` new; we hear strange music badly. When we hear another language `
`
` establishing the proposition referred to may indeed be great--it `
` is well known that Schopenhauer also was unsuccessful in his `
` efforts; and whoever has thoroughly realized how absurdly false `
` and sentimental this proposition is, in a world whose essence is `
` Will to Power, may be reminded that Schopenhauer, although a `
` pessimist, ACTUALLY--played the flute . . . daily after dinner: `
` one may read about the matter in his biography. A question by the `
` way: a pessimist, a repudiator of God and of the world, who MAKES `
` A HALT at morality--who assents to morality, and plays the flute `
` to laede-neminem morals, what? Is that really--a pessimist? `
` `
` 187. Apart from the value of such assertions as "there is a `
` categorical imperative in us," one can always ask: What does such `
` an assertion indicate about him who makes it? There are systems `
` of morals which are meant to justify their author in the eyes of `
` other people; other systems of morals are meant to tranquilize `
` him, and make him self-satisfied; with other systems he wants to `
` crucify and humble himself, with others he wishes to take revenge, `
` with others to conceal himself, with others to glorify himself and `
` gave superiority and distinction,--this system of morals helps its `
` author to forget, that system makes him, or something of him, `
` forgotten, many a moralist would like to exercise power and `
` creative arbitrariness over mankind, many another, perhaps, Kant `
` especially, gives us to understand by his morals that "what is `
` estimable in me, is that I know how to obey--and with you it SHALL `
` not be otherwise than with me!" In short, systems of morals are `
` only a SIGN-LANGUAGE OF THE EMOTIONS. `
` `
` 188. In contrast to laisser-aller, every system of morals is a `
` sort of tyranny against "nature" and also against "reason", that `
` is, however, no objection, unless one should again decree by some `
` system of morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness `
` are unlawful What is essential and invaluable in every system of `
` morals, is that it is a long constraint. In order to understand `
` Stoicism, or Port Royal, or Puritanism, one should remember the `
` constraint under which every language has attained to strength `
` and freedom--the metrical constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and `
` rhythm. How much trouble have the poets and orators of every `
` nation given themselves!--not excepting some of the prose writers `
` of today, in whose ear dwells an inexorable conscientiousness-- `
` "for the sake of a folly," as utilitarian bunglers say, and `
` thereby deem themselves wise--"from submission to arbitrary `
` laws," as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy themselves `
` "free," even free-spirited. The singular fact remains, however, `
` that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, `
` dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, `
` whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in `
` speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only `
` developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law, and in `
` all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this `
` is "nature" and "natural"--and not laisser-aller! Every artist `
` knows how different from the state of letting himself go, is his `
` "most natural" condition, the free arranging, locating, `
` disposing, and constructing in the moments of "inspiration"--and `
` how strictly and delicately he then obeys a thousand laws, which, `
` by their very rigidness and precision, defy all formulation by `
` means of ideas (even the most stable idea has, in comparison `
` therewith, something floating, manifold, and ambiguous in it). `
` The essential thing "in heaven and in earth" is, apparently (to `
` repeat it once more), that there should be long OBEDIENCE in the `
` same direction, there thereby results, and has always resulted in `
` the long run, something which has made life worth living; for `
` instance, virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality-- `
` anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish, or `
` divine. The long bondage of the spirit, the distrustful `
` constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which `
` the thinker imposed on himself to think in accordance with the `
` rules of a church or a court, or conformable to Aristotelian `
` premises, the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything `
` that happened according to a Christian scheme, and in every `
` occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God:--all this `
` violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness, and `
` unreasonableness, has proved itself the disciplinary means `
` whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its `
` remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility; granted also that much `
` irrecoverable strength and spirit had to be stifled, suffocated, `
` and spoilt in the process (for here, as everywhere, "nature" `
` shows herself as she is, in all her extravagant and INDIFFERENT `
` magnificence, which is shocking, but nevertheless noble). That `
` for centuries European thinkers only thought in order to prove `
` something-nowadays, on the contrary, we are suspicious of every `
` thinker who "wishes to prove something"--that it was always `
` settled beforehand what WAS TO BE the result of their strictest `
` thinking, as it was perhaps in the Asiatic astrology of former `
` times, or as it is still at the present day in the innocent, `
` Christian-moral explanation of immediate personal events "for the `
` glory of God," or "for the good of the soul":--this tyranny, this `
` arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has `
` EDUCATED the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer `
` sense, is apparently an indispensable means even of spiritual `
` education and discipline. One may look at every system of morals `
` in this light: it is "nature" therein which teaches to hate the `
` laisser-aller, the too great freedom, and implants the need for `
` limited horizons, for immediate duties--it teaches the NARROWING `
` OF PERSPECTIVES, and thus, in a certain sense, that stupidity is `
` a condition of life and development. "Thou must obey some one, `
` and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief, and lose `
` all respect for thyself"--this seems to me to be the moral `
` imperative of nature, which is certainly neither "categorical," `
` as old Kant wished (consequently the "otherwise"), nor does it `
` address itself to the individual (what does nature care for the `
` individual!), but to nations, races, ages, and ranks; above all, `
` however, to the animal "man" generally, to MANKIND. `
` `
` 189. Industrious races find it a great hardship to be idle: it `
` was a master stroke of ENGLISH instinct to hallow and begloom `
` Sunday to such an extent that the Englishman unconsciously `
` hankers for his week--and work-day again:--as a kind of cleverly `
` devised, cleverly intercalated FAST, such as is also frequently `
` found in the ancient world (although, as is appropriate in `
` southern nations, not precisely with respect to work). Many kinds `
` of fasts are necessary; and wherever powerful influences and `
` habits prevail, legislators have to see that intercalary days are `
` appointed, on which such impulses are fettered, and learn to `
` hunger anew. Viewed from a higher standpoint, whole generations `
` and epochs, when they show themselves infected with any moral `
` fanaticism, seem like those intercalated periods of restraint and `
` fasting, during which an impulse learns to humble and submit `
` itself--at the same time also to PURIFY and SHARPEN itself; `
` certain philosophical sects likewise admit of a similar `
` interpretation (for instance, the Stoa, in the midst of Hellenic `
` culture, with the atmosphere rank and overcharged with `
` Aphrodisiacal odours).--Here also is a hint for the explanation `
` of the paradox, why it was precisely in the most Christian period `
` of European history, and in general only under the pressure of `
` Christian sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated into `
` love (amour-passion). `
` `
` 190. There is something in the morality of Plato which does not `
` really belong to Plato, but which only appears in his philosophy, `
` one might say, in spite of him: namely, Socratism, for which he `
` himself was too noble. "No one desires to injure himself, hence `
` all evil is done unwittingly. The evil man inflicts injury on `
` himself; he would not do so, however, if he knew that evil is `
` evil. The evil man, therefore, is only evil through error; if one `
` free him from error one will necessarily make him--good."--This `
` mode of reasoning savours of the POPULACE, who perceive only the `
` unpleasant consequences of evil-doing, and practically judge that `
` "it is STUPID to do wrong"; while they accept "good" as identical `
` with "useful and pleasant," without further thought. As regards `
` every system of utilitarianism, one may at once assume that it `
` has the same origin, and follow the scent: one will seldom err.-- `
` Plato did all he could to interpret something refined and noble `
` into the tenets of his teacher, and above all to interpret `
` himself into them--he, the most daring of all interpreters, who `
` lifted the entire Socrates out of the street, as a popular theme `
` and song, to exhibit him in endless and impossible modifications `
` --namely, in all his own disguises and multiplicities. In jest, `
` and in Homeric language as well, what is the Platonic Socrates, `
` if not-- [Greek words inserted here.] `
` `
` 191. The old theological problem of "Faith" and "Knowledge," or `
` more plainly, of instinct and reason--the question whether, in `
` respect to the valuation of things, instinct deserves more `
` authority than rationality, which wants to appreciate and act `
` according to motives, according to a "Why," that is to say, in `
` conformity to purpose and utility--it is always the old moral `
` problem that first appeared in the person of Socrates, and had `
` divided men's minds long before Christianity. Socrates himself, `
` following, of course, the taste of his talent--that of a `
` surpassing dialectician--took first the side of reason; and, in `
` fact, what did he do all his life but laugh at the awkward `
` incapacity of the noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like `
` all noble men, and could never give satisfactory answers `
` concerning the motives of their actions? In the end, however, `
` though silently and secretly, he laughed also at himself: with `
` his finer conscience and introspection, he found in himself the `
` same difficulty and incapacity. "But why"--he said to himself-- `
` "should one on that account separate oneself from the instincts! `
` One must set them right, and the reason ALSO--one must follow the `
` instincts, but at the same time persuade the reason to support `
` them with good arguments." This was the real FALSENESS of that `
` great and mysterious ironist; he brought his conscience up to the `
` point that he was satisfied with a kind of self-outwitting: in `
` fact, he perceived the irrationality in the moral judgment.-- `
` Plato, more innocent in such matters, and without the craftiness `
` of the plebeian, wished to prove to himself, at the expenditure `
` of all his strength--the greatest strength a philosopher had ever `
` expended--that reason and instinct lead spontaneously to one `
` goal, to the good, to "God"; and since Plato, all theologians and `
` philosophers have followed the same path--which means that in `
` matters of morality, instinct (or as Christians call it, "Faith," `
` or as I call it, "the herd") has hitherto triumphed. Unless one `
` should make an exception in the case of Descartes, the father of `
` rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), `
` who recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only a `
` tool, and Descartes was superficial. `
` `
` 192. Whoever has followed the history of a single science, finds `
` in its development a clue to the understanding of the oldest and `
` commonest processes of all "knowledge and cognizance": there, as `
` here, the premature hypotheses, the fictions, the good stupid `
` will to "belief," and the lack of distrust and patience are first `
` developed--our senses learn late, and never learn completely, to `
` be subtle, reliable, and cautious organs of knowledge. Our eyes `
` find it easier on a given occasion to produce a picture already `
` often produced, than to seize upon the divergence and novelty of `
` an impression: the latter requires more force, more "morality." `
` It is difficult and painful for the ear to listen to anything `
` new; we hear strange music badly. When we hear another language `
`