Reading Help Beyond good and evil
it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. `
` The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life- `
` preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we `
` are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions `
` (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong), are the most `
` indispensable to us, that without a recognition of logical `
` fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely `
` IMAGINED world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant `
` counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not `
` live--that the renunciation of false opinions would be a `
` renunciation of life, a negation of life. TO RECOGNISE UNTRUTH AS `
` A CONDITION OF LIFE; that is certainly to impugn the traditional `
` ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which `
` ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good `
` and evil. `
` `
` 5. That which causes philosophers to be regarded half- `
` distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated `
` discovery how innocent they are--how often and easily they make `
` mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike `
` they are,--but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, `
` whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the `
` problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. `
` They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered `
` and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely `
` indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, `
` fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a `
` prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally `
` their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them `
` with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates `
` who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute `
` defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths,"-- `
` and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this `
` to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage `
` which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn `
` friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The `
` spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and `
` decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that `
` lead (more correctly mislead) to his "categorical imperative"-- `
` makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in `
` spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical `
` preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical `
` form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his `
` philosophy in mail and mask--in fact, the "love of HIS wisdom," `
` to translate the term fairly and squarely--in order thereby to `
` strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should `
` dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas `
` Athene:--how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does `
` this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray! `
` `
` 6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great `
` philosophy up till now has consisted of--namely, the confession `
` of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious `
` auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose `
` in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of `
` which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand `
` how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have `
` been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask `
` oneself: "What morality do they (or does he) aim at?" `
` Accordingly, I do not believe that an "impulse to knowledge" is `
` the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as `
` elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken `
` knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the `
` fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far `
` they may have here acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons and `
` cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at `
` one time or another, and that each one of them would have been `
` only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of `
` existence and the legitimate LORD over all the other impulses. `
` For every impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to `
` philosophize. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of `
` really scientific men, it may be otherwise--"better," if you `
` will; there there may really be such a thing as an "impulse to `
` knowledge," some kind of small, independent clock-work, which, `
` when well wound up, works away industriously to that end, WITHOUT `
` the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part `
` therein. The actual "interests" of the scholar, therefore, are `
` generally in quite another direction--in the family, perhaps, or `
` in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost `
` indifferent at what point of research his little machine is `
` placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good `
` philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not `
` CHARACTERISED by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on `
` the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above `
` all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as `
` to WHO HE IS,--that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses `
` of his nature stand to each other. `
` `
` 7. How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more `
` stinging than the joke Epicurus took the liberty of making on `
` Plato and the Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its `
` original sense, and on the face of it, the word signifies `
` "Flatterers of Dionysius"--consequently, tyrants' accessories and `
` lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as to say, `
` "They are all ACTORS, there is nothing genuine about them" (for `
` Dionysiokolax was a popular name for an actor). And the latter is `
` really the malignant reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he `
` was annoyed by the grandiose manner, the mise en scene style of `
` which Plato and his scholars were masters--of which Epicurus was `
` not a master! He, the old school-teacher of Samos, who sat `
` concealed in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred `
` books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato, who `
` knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the garden-god `
` Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out? `
` `
` 8. There is a point in every philosophy at which the "conviction" `
` of the philosopher appears on the scene; or, to put it in the `
` words of an ancient mystery: `
` `
` Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus. `
` `
` 9. You desire to LIVE "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble `
` Stoics, what fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like `
` Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without `
` purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once `
` fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves `
` INDIFFERENCE as a power--how COULD you live in accordance with `
` such indifference? To live--is not that just endeavouring to be `
` otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, `
` being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And `
` granted that your imperative, "living according to Nature," means `
` actually the same as "living according to life"--how could you do `
` DIFFERENTLY? Why should you make a principle out of what you `
` yourselves are, and must be? In reality, however, it is quite `
` otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture the `
` canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the `
` contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In `
` your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, `
` to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist `
` that it shall be Nature "according to the Stoa," and would like `
` everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal `
` glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for `
` truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and `
` with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature FALSELY, that is to `
` say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise-- `
` and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you `
` the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able to tyrannize over `
` yourselves--Stoicism is self-tyranny--Nature will also allow `
` herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic a PART of `
` Nature? . . . But this is an old and everlasting story: what `
` happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as `
` soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always `
` creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; `
` philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual `
` Will to Power, the will to "creation of the world," the will to `
` the causa prima. `
` `
` 10. The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, `
` with which the problem of "the real and the apparent world" is `
` dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for `
` thought and attention; and he who hears only a "Will to Truth" in `
` the background, and nothing else, cannot certainly boast of the `
` sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really have `
` happened that such a Will to Truth--a certain extravagant and `
` adventurous pluck, a metaphysician's ambition of the forlorn `
` hope--has participated therein: that which in the end always `
` prefers a handful of "certainty" to a whole cartload of beautiful `
` possibilities; there may even be puritanical fanatics of `
` conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure nothing, `
` rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism, and `
` the sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding `
` the courageous bearing such a virtue may display. It seems, `
` however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier thinkers who `
` are still eager for life. In that they side AGAINST appearance, `
` and speak superciliously of "perspective," in that they rank the `
` credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility `
` of the ocular evidence that "the earth stands still," and thus, `
` apparently, allowing with complacency their securest possession `
` to escape (for what does one at present believe in more firmly `
` than in one's body?),--who knows if they are not really trying to `
` win back something which was formerly an even securer possession, `
` something of the old domain of the faith of former times, perhaps `
` the "immortal soul," perhaps "the old God," in short, ideas by `
` which they could live better, that is to say, more vigorously and `
` more joyously, than by "modern ideas"? There is DISTRUST of these `
` modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a disbelief in `
` all that has been constructed yesterday and today; there is `
` perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn, which can no `
` longer endure the BRIC-A-BRAC of ideas of the most varied origin, `
` such as so-called Positivism at present throws on the market; a `
` disgust of the more refined taste at the village-fair motleyness `
` and patchiness of all these reality-philosophasters, in whom `
` there is nothing either new or true, except this motleyness. `
` Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those skeptical `
` anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; `
` their instinct, which repels them from MODERN reality, is `
` unrefuted . . . what do their retrograde by-paths concern us! `
` The main thing about them is NOT that they wish to go "back," `
` but that they wish to get AWAY therefrom. A little MORE strength, `
` swing, courage, and artistic power, and they would be OFF--and `
` not back! `
` `
` 11. It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present `
` to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant `
` exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore `
` prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and `
` foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he `
` said: "This is the most difficult thing that could ever be `
` undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." Let us only understand this `
` "could be"! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty in `
` man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he `
`
` The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life- `
` preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we `
` are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions `
` (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong), are the most `
` indispensable to us, that without a recognition of logical `
` fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely `
` IMAGINED world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant `
` counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not `
` live--that the renunciation of false opinions would be a `
` renunciation of life, a negation of life. TO RECOGNISE UNTRUTH AS `
` A CONDITION OF LIFE; that is certainly to impugn the traditional `
` ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which `
` ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good `
` and evil. `
` `
` 5. That which causes philosophers to be regarded half- `
` distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated `
` discovery how innocent they are--how often and easily they make `
` mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike `
` they are,--but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, `
` whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the `
` problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. `
` They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered `
` and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely `
` indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, `
` fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a `
` prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally `
` their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them `
` with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates `
` who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute `
` defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths,"-- `
` and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this `
` to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage `
` which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn `
` friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The `
` spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and `
` decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that `
` lead (more correctly mislead) to his "categorical imperative"-- `
` makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in `
` spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical `
` preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical `
` form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his `
` philosophy in mail and mask--in fact, the "love of HIS wisdom," `
` to translate the term fairly and squarely--in order thereby to `
` strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should `
` dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas `
` Athene:--how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does `
` this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray! `
` `
` 6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great `
` philosophy up till now has consisted of--namely, the confession `
` of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious `
` auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose `
` in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of `
` which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand `
` how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have `
` been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask `
` oneself: "What morality do they (or does he) aim at?" `
` Accordingly, I do not believe that an "impulse to knowledge" is `
` the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as `
` elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken `
` knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the `
` fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far `
` they may have here acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons and `
` cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at `
` one time or another, and that each one of them would have been `
` only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of `
` existence and the legitimate LORD over all the other impulses. `
` For every impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to `
` philosophize. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of `
` really scientific men, it may be otherwise--"better," if you `
` will; there there may really be such a thing as an "impulse to `
` knowledge," some kind of small, independent clock-work, which, `
` when well wound up, works away industriously to that end, WITHOUT `
` the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part `
` therein. The actual "interests" of the scholar, therefore, are `
` generally in quite another direction--in the family, perhaps, or `
` in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost `
` indifferent at what point of research his little machine is `
` placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good `
` philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not `
` CHARACTERISED by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on `
` the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above `
` all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as `
` to WHO HE IS,--that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses `
` of his nature stand to each other. `
` `
` 7. How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more `
` stinging than the joke Epicurus took the liberty of making on `
` Plato and the Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its `
` original sense, and on the face of it, the word signifies `
` "Flatterers of Dionysius"--consequently, tyrants' accessories and `
` lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as to say, `
` "They are all ACTORS, there is nothing genuine about them" (for `
` Dionysiokolax was a popular name for an actor). And the latter is `
` really the malignant reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he `
` was annoyed by the grandiose manner, the mise en scene style of `
` which Plato and his scholars were masters--of which Epicurus was `
` not a master! He, the old school-teacher of Samos, who sat `
` concealed in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred `
` books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato, who `
` knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the garden-god `
` Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out? `
` `
` 8. There is a point in every philosophy at which the "conviction" `
` of the philosopher appears on the scene; or, to put it in the `
` words of an ancient mystery: `
` `
` Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus. `
` `
` 9. You desire to LIVE "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble `
` Stoics, what fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like `
` Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without `
` purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once `
` fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves `
` INDIFFERENCE as a power--how COULD you live in accordance with `
` such indifference? To live--is not that just endeavouring to be `
` otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, `
` being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And `
` granted that your imperative, "living according to Nature," means `
` actually the same as "living according to life"--how could you do `
` DIFFERENTLY? Why should you make a principle out of what you `
` yourselves are, and must be? In reality, however, it is quite `
` otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture the `
` canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the `
` contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In `
` your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, `
` to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist `
` that it shall be Nature "according to the Stoa," and would like `
` everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal `
` glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for `
` truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and `
` with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature FALSELY, that is to `
` say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise-- `
` and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you `
` the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able to tyrannize over `
` yourselves--Stoicism is self-tyranny--Nature will also allow `
` herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic a PART of `
` Nature? . . . But this is an old and everlasting story: what `
` happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as `
` soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always `
` creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; `
` philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual `
` Will to Power, the will to "creation of the world," the will to `
` the causa prima. `
` `
` 10. The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, `
` with which the problem of "the real and the apparent world" is `
` dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for `
` thought and attention; and he who hears only a "Will to Truth" in `
` the background, and nothing else, cannot certainly boast of the `
` sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really have `
` happened that such a Will to Truth--a certain extravagant and `
` adventurous pluck, a metaphysician's ambition of the forlorn `
` hope--has participated therein: that which in the end always `
` prefers a handful of "certainty" to a whole cartload of beautiful `
` possibilities; there may even be puritanical fanatics of `
` conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure nothing, `
` rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism, and `
` the sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding `
` the courageous bearing such a virtue may display. It seems, `
` however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier thinkers who `
` are still eager for life. In that they side AGAINST appearance, `
` and speak superciliously of "perspective," in that they rank the `
` credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility `
` of the ocular evidence that "the earth stands still," and thus, `
` apparently, allowing with complacency their securest possession `
` to escape (for what does one at present believe in more firmly `
` than in one's body?),--who knows if they are not really trying to `
` win back something which was formerly an even securer possession, `
` something of the old domain of the faith of former times, perhaps `
` the "immortal soul," perhaps "the old God," in short, ideas by `
` which they could live better, that is to say, more vigorously and `
` more joyously, than by "modern ideas"? There is DISTRUST of these `
` modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a disbelief in `
` all that has been constructed yesterday and today; there is `
` perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn, which can no `
` longer endure the BRIC-A-BRAC of ideas of the most varied origin, `
` such as so-called Positivism at present throws on the market; a `
` disgust of the more refined taste at the village-fair motleyness `
` and patchiness of all these reality-philosophasters, in whom `
` there is nothing either new or true, except this motleyness. `
` Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those skeptical `
` anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; `
` their instinct, which repels them from MODERN reality, is `
` unrefuted . . . what do their retrograde by-paths concern us! `
` The main thing about them is NOT that they wish to go "back," `
` but that they wish to get AWAY therefrom. A little MORE strength, `
` swing, courage, and artistic power, and they would be OFF--and `
` not back! `
` `
` 11. It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present `
` to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant `
` exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore `
` prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and `
` foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he `
` said: "This is the most difficult thing that could ever be `
` undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." Let us only understand this `
` "could be"! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty in `
` man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he `
`