Reading Help Beyond good and evil
man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he `
` deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid `
` flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his `
` pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to `
` discover if possible something--at all events "new faculties"--of `
` which to be still prouder!--But let us reflect for a moment--it `
` is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori `
` POSSIBLE?" Kant asks himself--and what is really his answer? "BY `
` MEANS OF A MEANS (faculty)"--but unfortunately not in five words, `
` but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of `
` German profundity and verbal flourishes, that one altogether `
` loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such `
` an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this `
` new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant `
` further discovered a moral faculty in man--for at that time `
` Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the "Politics of `
` hard fact." Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the `
` young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately `
` into the groves--all seeking for "faculties." And what did they `
` not find--in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of `
` the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, `
` piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between `
` "finding" and "inventing"! Above all a faculty for the `
` "transcendental"; Schelling christened it, intellectual `
` intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the `
` naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to `
` the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was `
` really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so `
` boldly, in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it `
` seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, `
` however--the world grew older, and the dream vanished. A time `
` came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them `
` today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost--old `
` Kant. "By means of a means (faculty)"--he had said, or at least `
` meant to say. But, is that--an answer? An explanation? Or is it `
` not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium `
` induce sleep? "By means of a means (faculty), "namely the virtus `
` dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere, `
` `
` Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva, `
` Cujus est natura sensus assoupire. `
` `
` But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high `
` time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic `
` judgments a PRIORI possible?" by another question, "Why is belief `
` in such judgments necessary?"--in effect, it is high time that we `
` should understand that such judgments must be believed to be `
` true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like `
` ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! `
` Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily--synthetic `
` judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all; we have no `
` right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false `
` judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is `
` necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence belonging to `
` the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the `
` enormous influence which "German philosophy"--I hope you `
` understand its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)?--has `
` exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that `
` a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA had a share in it; thanks to German `
` philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, `
` the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians, and the `
` political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to `
` the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last `
` century into this, in short--"sensus assoupire." . . . `
` `
` 12. As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best- `
` refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is `
` now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to `
` attach serious signification to it, except for convenient `
` everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)-- `
` thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus `
` have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of `
` ocular evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to `
` believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does NOT `
` stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the `
` last thing that "stood fast" of the earth--the belief in `
` "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle- `
` atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has `
` hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still `
` further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, `
` against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous `
` after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more `
` celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all `
` give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous `
` atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL- `
` ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the `
` belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, `
` eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought `
` to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all `
` necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one `
` of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens `
` frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch `
` on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open `
` for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and `
` such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective `
` multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and `
` passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. `
` In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the `
` superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical `
` luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, `
` thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust--it is `
` possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more `
` comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that `
` precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT--and, who knows? `
` perhaps to DISCOVER the new. `
` `
` 13. Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down `
` the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an `
` organic being. A living thing seeks above all to DISCHARGE its `
` strength--life itself is WILL TO POWER; self-preservation is only `
` one of the indirect and most frequent RESULTS thereof. In short, `
` here, as everywhere else, let us beware of SUPERFLUOUS `
` teleological principles!--one of which is the instinct of self- `
` preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, `
` in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy `
` of principles. `
` `
` 14. It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural `
` philosophy is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement `
` (according to us, if I may say so!) and NOT a world-explanation; `
` but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is `
` regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as `
` more--namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its `
` own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this `
` operates fascinatingly, persuasively, and CONVINCINGLY upon an `
` age with fundamentally plebeian tastes--in fact, it follows `
` instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular sensualism. `
` What is clear, what is "explained"? Only that which can be seen `
` and felt--one must pursue every problem thus far. Obversely, `
` however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which was an `
` ARISTOCRATIC mode, consisted precisely in RESISTANCE to obvious `
` sense-evidence--perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and `
` more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how `
` to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this `
` by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they `
` threw over the motley whirl of the senses--the mob of the senses, `
` as Plato said. In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting `
` of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an ENJOYMENT `
` different from that which the physicists of today offer us--and `
` likewise the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the `
` physiological workers, with their principle of the "smallest `
` possible effort," and the greatest possible blunder. "Where there `
` is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more `
` for men to do"--that is certainly an imperative different from `
` the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right `
` imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridge- `
` builders of the future, who have nothing but ROUGH work to `
` perform. `
` `
` 15. To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist `
` on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense `
` of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be `
` causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, `
` if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the `
` external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a `
` part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But `
` then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It `
` seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, if the `
` conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally absurd. `
` Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs--? `
` `
` 16. There are still harmless self-observers who believe that `
` there are "immediate certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as `
` the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though `
` cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the `
` thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either `
` on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, `
` however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as `
` "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a `
` CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from `
` the misleading significance of words! The people on their part `
` may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the `
` philosopher must say to himself: "When I analyze the process that `
` is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of `
` daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be `
` difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is _I_ who `
` think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that `
` thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who `
` is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, `
` that it is already determined what is to be designated by `
` thinking--that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already `
` decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I `
` determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps `
` 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' `
` assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present moment with other `
` states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; `
` on account of this retrospective connection with further `
` 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for `
` me."--In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people `
` may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a `
` series of metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable `
` conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: "Whence did I get `
` the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? `
` What gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an `
` 'ego' as cause, and finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?" He `
` who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an `
` appeal to a sort of INTUITIVE perception, like the person who `
` says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, `
` and certain"--will encounter a smile and two notes of `
` interrogation in a philosopher nowadays. "Sir," the philosopher `
` will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you `
`
` deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid `
` flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his `
` pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to `
` discover if possible something--at all events "new faculties"--of `
` which to be still prouder!--But let us reflect for a moment--it `
` is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori `
` POSSIBLE?" Kant asks himself--and what is really his answer? "BY `
` MEANS OF A MEANS (faculty)"--but unfortunately not in five words, `
` but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of `
` German profundity and verbal flourishes, that one altogether `
` loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such `
` an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this `
` new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant `
` further discovered a moral faculty in man--for at that time `
` Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the "Politics of `
` hard fact." Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the `
` young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately `
` into the groves--all seeking for "faculties." And what did they `
` not find--in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of `
` the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, `
` piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between `
` "finding" and "inventing"! Above all a faculty for the `
` "transcendental"; Schelling christened it, intellectual `
` intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the `
` naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to `
` the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was `
` really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so `
` boldly, in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it `
` seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, `
` however--the world grew older, and the dream vanished. A time `
` came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them `
` today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost--old `
` Kant. "By means of a means (faculty)"--he had said, or at least `
` meant to say. But, is that--an answer? An explanation? Or is it `
` not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium `
` induce sleep? "By means of a means (faculty), "namely the virtus `
` dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere, `
` `
` Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva, `
` Cujus est natura sensus assoupire. `
` `
` But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high `
` time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic `
` judgments a PRIORI possible?" by another question, "Why is belief `
` in such judgments necessary?"--in effect, it is high time that we `
` should understand that such judgments must be believed to be `
` true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like `
` ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! `
` Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily--synthetic `
` judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all; we have no `
` right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false `
` judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is `
` necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence belonging to `
` the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the `
` enormous influence which "German philosophy"--I hope you `
` understand its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)?--has `
` exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that `
` a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA had a share in it; thanks to German `
` philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, `
` the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians, and the `
` political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to `
` the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last `
` century into this, in short--"sensus assoupire." . . . `
` `
` 12. As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best- `
` refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is `
` now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to `
` attach serious signification to it, except for convenient `
` everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)-- `
` thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus `
` have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of `
` ocular evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to `
` believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does NOT `
` stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the `
` last thing that "stood fast" of the earth--the belief in `
` "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle- `
` atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has `
` hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still `
` further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, `
` against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous `
` after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more `
` celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all `
` give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous `
` atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL- `
` ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the `
` belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, `
` eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought `
` to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all `
` necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one `
` of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens `
` frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch `
` on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open `
` for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and `
` such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective `
` multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and `
` passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. `
` In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the `
` superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical `
` luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, `
` thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust--it is `
` possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more `
` comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that `
` precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT--and, who knows? `
` perhaps to DISCOVER the new. `
` `
` 13. Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down `
` the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an `
` organic being. A living thing seeks above all to DISCHARGE its `
` strength--life itself is WILL TO POWER; self-preservation is only `
` one of the indirect and most frequent RESULTS thereof. In short, `
` here, as everywhere else, let us beware of SUPERFLUOUS `
` teleological principles!--one of which is the instinct of self- `
` preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, `
` in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy `
` of principles. `
` `
` 14. It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural `
` philosophy is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement `
` (according to us, if I may say so!) and NOT a world-explanation; `
` but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is `
` regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as `
` more--namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its `
` own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this `
` operates fascinatingly, persuasively, and CONVINCINGLY upon an `
` age with fundamentally plebeian tastes--in fact, it follows `
` instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular sensualism. `
` What is clear, what is "explained"? Only that which can be seen `
` and felt--one must pursue every problem thus far. Obversely, `
` however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which was an `
` ARISTOCRATIC mode, consisted precisely in RESISTANCE to obvious `
` sense-evidence--perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and `
` more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how `
` to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this `
` by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they `
` threw over the motley whirl of the senses--the mob of the senses, `
` as Plato said. In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting `
` of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an ENJOYMENT `
` different from that which the physicists of today offer us--and `
` likewise the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the `
` physiological workers, with their principle of the "smallest `
` possible effort," and the greatest possible blunder. "Where there `
` is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more `
` for men to do"--that is certainly an imperative different from `
` the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right `
` imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridge- `
` builders of the future, who have nothing but ROUGH work to `
` perform. `
` `
` 15. To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist `
` on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense `
` of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be `
` causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, `
` if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the `
` external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a `
` part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But `
` then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It `
` seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, if the `
` conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally absurd. `
` Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs--? `
` `
` 16. There are still harmless self-observers who believe that `
` there are "immediate certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as `
` the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though `
` cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the `
` thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either `
` on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, `
` however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as `
` "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a `
` CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from `
` the misleading significance of words! The people on their part `
` may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the `
` philosopher must say to himself: "When I analyze the process that `
` is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of `
` daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be `
` difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is _I_ who `
` think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that `
` thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who `
` is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, `
` that it is already determined what is to be designated by `
` thinking--that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already `
` decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I `
` determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps `
` 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' `
` assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present moment with other `
` states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; `
` on account of this retrospective connection with further `
` 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for `
` me."--In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people `
` may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a `
` series of metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable `
` conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: "Whence did I get `
` the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? `
` What gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an `
` 'ego' as cause, and finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?" He `
` who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an `
` appeal to a sort of INTUITIVE perception, like the person who `
` says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, `
` and certain"--will encounter a smile and two notes of `
` interrogation in a philosopher nowadays. "Sir," the philosopher `
` will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you `
`