Reading Help Beyond good and evil
will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you `
` are not mistaken, but why should it be the truth?" `
` `
` 17. With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never `
` tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly `
` recognized by these credulous minds--namely, that a thought comes `
` when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a `
` PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" `
` is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that `
` this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it `
` mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an `
` "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with `
` this "one thinks"--even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of `
` the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One `
` infers here according to the usual grammatical formula--"To think `
` is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; `
` consequently" . . . It was pretty much on the same lines that the `
` older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material `
` particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates--the `
` atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along `
` without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall `
` accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to `
` get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" `
` has refined itself). `
` `
` 18. It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is `
` refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more `
` subtle minds. It seems that the hundred-times-refuted theory of `
` the "free will" owes its persistence to this charm alone; some `
` one is always appearing who feels himself strong enough to refute `
` it. `
` `
` 19. Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it `
` were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has `
` given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, `
` absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. `
` But it again and again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer `
` also only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing-he `
` seems to have adopted a POPULAR PREJUDICE and exaggerated it. `
` Willing-seems to me to be above all something COMPLICATED, `
` something that is a unity only in name--and it is precisely in a `
` name that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the mastery over `
` the inadequate precautions of philosophers in all ages. So let us `
` for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let us `
` say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of `
` sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM `
` WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we `
` go," the sensation of this "FROM" and "TOWARDS" itself, and then `
` besides, an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without `
` our putting in motion "arms and legs," commences its action by `
` force of habit, directly we "will" anything. Therefore, just as `
` sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be `
` recognized as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, `
` thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the will there `
` is a ruling thought;--and let us not imagine it possible to sever `
` this thought from the "willing," as if the will would then remain `
` over! In the third place, the will is not only a complex of `
` sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in `
` fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed "freedom of `
` the will" is essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to `
` him who must obey: "I am free, 'he' must obey"--this `
` consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the `
` straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself `
` exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this `
` and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that `
` obedience will be rendered--and whatever else pertains to the `
` position of the commander. A man who WILLS commands something `
` within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes `
` renders obedience. But now let us notice what is the strangest `
` thing about the will,--this affair so extremely complex, for `
` which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the given `
` circumstances we are at the same time the commanding AND the `
` obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations `
` of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which `
` usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, `
` on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, `
` and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term `
` "I": a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of `
` false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the `
` act of willing--to such a degree that he who wills believes `
` firmly that willing SUFFICES for action. Since in the majority of `
` cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the `
` command--consequently obedience, and therefore action--was to be `
` EXPECTED, the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the `
` sentiment, as if there were a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he `
` who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and `
` action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out `
` of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an `
` increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success. `
` "Freedom of Will"--that is the expression for the complex state `
` of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at `
` the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order-- `
` who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks `
` within himself that it was really his own will that overcame `
` them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the `
` feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the `
` useful "underwills" or under-souls--indeed, our body is but a `
` social structure composed of many souls--to his feelings of `
` delight as commander. L'EFFET C'EST MOI. what happens here is `
` what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, `
` namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the `
` successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a `
` question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already `
` said, of a social structure composed of many "souls", on which `
` account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing- `
` as-such within the sphere of morals--regarded as the doctrine of `
` the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life" `
` manifests itself. `
` `
` 20. That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything `
` optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and `
` relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and `
` arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they `
` nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective `
` members of the fauna of a Continent--is betrayed in the end by `
` the circumstance: how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers `
` always fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of POSSIBLE `
` philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once `
` more in the same orbit, however independent of each other they `
` may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, `
` something within them leads them, something impels them in `
` definite order the one after the other--to wit, the innate `
` methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is, `
` in fact, far less a discovery than a re-recognizing, a `
` remembering, a return and a home-coming to a far-off, ancient `
` common-household of the soul, out of which those ideas formerly `
` grew: philosophizing is so far a kind of atavism of the highest `
` order. The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and `
` German philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where `
` there is affinity of language, owing to the common philosophy of `
` grammar--I mean owing to the unconscious domination and guidance `
` of similar grammatical functions--it cannot but be that `
` everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development `
` and succession of philosophical systems, just as the way seems `
` barred against certain other possibilities of world- `
` interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within `
` the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where the conception of `
` the subject is least developed) look otherwise "into the world," `
` and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the `
` Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain grammatical `
` functions is ultimately also the spell of PHYSIOLOGICAL `
` valuations and racial conditions.--So much by way of rejecting `
` Locke's superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas. `
` `
` 21. The CAUSA SUI is the best self-contradiction that has yet `
` been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and `
` unnaturalness; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to `
` entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly. `
` The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical `
` sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of `
` the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate `
` responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the `
` world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing `
` less than to be precisely this CAUSA SUI, and, with more than `
` Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, `
` out of the slough of nothingness. If any one should find out in `
` this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of `
` "free will" and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him `
` to carry his "enlightenment" a step further, and also put out of `
` his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of "free `
` will": I mean "non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse of `
` cause and effect. One should not wrongly MATERIALISE "cause" and `
` "effect," as the natural philosophers do (and whoever like them `
` naturalize in thinking at present), according to the prevailing `
` mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until `
` it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as `
` pure CONCEPTIONS, that is to say, as conventional fictions for `
` the purpose of designation and mutual understanding,--NOT for `
` explanation. In "being-in-itself" there is nothing of "casual- `
` connection," of "necessity," or of "psychological non-freedom"; `
` there the effect does NOT follow the cause, there "law" does not `
` obtain. It is WE alone who have devised cause, sequence, `
` reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, `
` motive, and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this `
` symbol-world, as "being-in-itself," with things, we act once more `
` as we have always acted--MYTHOLOGICALLY. The "non-free will" is `
` mythology; in real life it is only a question of STRONG and WEAK `
` wills.--It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in `
` himself, when a thinker, in every "causal-connection" and `
` "psychological necessity," manifests something of compulsion, `
` indigence, obsequiousness, oppression, and non-freedom; it is `
` suspicious to have such feelings--the person betrays himself. And `
` in general, if I have observed correctly, the "non-freedom of the `
` will" is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite `
` standpoints, but always in a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some `
` will not give up their "responsibility," their belief in `
` THEMSELVES, the personal right to THEIR merits, at any price (the `
` vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not `
` wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and `
` owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE `
` BUSINESS, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are `
` in the habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort `
` of socialistic sympathy is their favourite disguise. And as a `
` matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak-willed embellishes `
` itself surprisingly when it can pose as "la religion de la `
` souffrance humaine"; that is ITS "good taste." `
` `
` 22. Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist `
` from the mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of `
` interpretation, but "Nature's conformity to law," of which you `
` physicists talk so proudly, as though--why, it exists only owing `
`
` are not mistaken, but why should it be the truth?" `
` `
` 17. With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never `
` tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly `
` recognized by these credulous minds--namely, that a thought comes `
` when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a `
` PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" `
` is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that `
` this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it `
` mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an `
` "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with `
` this "one thinks"--even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of `
` the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One `
` infers here according to the usual grammatical formula--"To think `
` is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; `
` consequently" . . . It was pretty much on the same lines that the `
` older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material `
` particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates--the `
` atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along `
` without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall `
` accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to `
` get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" `
` has refined itself). `
` `
` 18. It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is `
` refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more `
` subtle minds. It seems that the hundred-times-refuted theory of `
` the "free will" owes its persistence to this charm alone; some `
` one is always appearing who feels himself strong enough to refute `
` it. `
` `
` 19. Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it `
` were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has `
` given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, `
` absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. `
` But it again and again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer `
` also only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing-he `
` seems to have adopted a POPULAR PREJUDICE and exaggerated it. `
` Willing-seems to me to be above all something COMPLICATED, `
` something that is a unity only in name--and it is precisely in a `
` name that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the mastery over `
` the inadequate precautions of philosophers in all ages. So let us `
` for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let us `
` say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of `
` sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM `
` WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we `
` go," the sensation of this "FROM" and "TOWARDS" itself, and then `
` besides, an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without `
` our putting in motion "arms and legs," commences its action by `
` force of habit, directly we "will" anything. Therefore, just as `
` sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be `
` recognized as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, `
` thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the will there `
` is a ruling thought;--and let us not imagine it possible to sever `
` this thought from the "willing," as if the will would then remain `
` over! In the third place, the will is not only a complex of `
` sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in `
` fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed "freedom of `
` the will" is essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to `
` him who must obey: "I am free, 'he' must obey"--this `
` consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the `
` straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself `
` exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this `
` and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that `
` obedience will be rendered--and whatever else pertains to the `
` position of the commander. A man who WILLS commands something `
` within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes `
` renders obedience. But now let us notice what is the strangest `
` thing about the will,--this affair so extremely complex, for `
` which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the given `
` circumstances we are at the same time the commanding AND the `
` obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations `
` of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which `
` usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, `
` on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, `
` and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term `
` "I": a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of `
` false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the `
` act of willing--to such a degree that he who wills believes `
` firmly that willing SUFFICES for action. Since in the majority of `
` cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the `
` command--consequently obedience, and therefore action--was to be `
` EXPECTED, the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the `
` sentiment, as if there were a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he `
` who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and `
` action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out `
` of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an `
` increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success. `
` "Freedom of Will"--that is the expression for the complex state `
` of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at `
` the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order-- `
` who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks `
` within himself that it was really his own will that overcame `
` them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the `
` feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the `
` useful "underwills" or under-souls--indeed, our body is but a `
` social structure composed of many souls--to his feelings of `
` delight as commander. L'EFFET C'EST MOI. what happens here is `
` what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, `
` namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the `
` successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a `
` question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already `
` said, of a social structure composed of many "souls", on which `
` account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing- `
` as-such within the sphere of morals--regarded as the doctrine of `
` the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life" `
` manifests itself. `
` `
` 20. That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything `
` optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and `
` relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and `
` arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they `
` nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective `
` members of the fauna of a Continent--is betrayed in the end by `
` the circumstance: how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers `
` always fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of POSSIBLE `
` philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once `
` more in the same orbit, however independent of each other they `
` may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, `
` something within them leads them, something impels them in `
` definite order the one after the other--to wit, the innate `
` methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is, `
` in fact, far less a discovery than a re-recognizing, a `
` remembering, a return and a home-coming to a far-off, ancient `
` common-household of the soul, out of which those ideas formerly `
` grew: philosophizing is so far a kind of atavism of the highest `
` order. The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and `
` German philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where `
` there is affinity of language, owing to the common philosophy of `
` grammar--I mean owing to the unconscious domination and guidance `
` of similar grammatical functions--it cannot but be that `
` everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development `
` and succession of philosophical systems, just as the way seems `
` barred against certain other possibilities of world- `
` interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within `
` the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where the conception of `
` the subject is least developed) look otherwise "into the world," `
` and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the `
` Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain grammatical `
` functions is ultimately also the spell of PHYSIOLOGICAL `
` valuations and racial conditions.--So much by way of rejecting `
` Locke's superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas. `
` `
` 21. The CAUSA SUI is the best self-contradiction that has yet `
` been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and `
` unnaturalness; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to `
` entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly. `
` The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical `
` sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of `
` the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate `
` responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the `
` world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing `
` less than to be precisely this CAUSA SUI, and, with more than `
` Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, `
` out of the slough of nothingness. If any one should find out in `
` this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of `
` "free will" and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him `
` to carry his "enlightenment" a step further, and also put out of `
` his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of "free `
` will": I mean "non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse of `
` cause and effect. One should not wrongly MATERIALISE "cause" and `
` "effect," as the natural philosophers do (and whoever like them `
` naturalize in thinking at present), according to the prevailing `
` mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until `
` it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as `
` pure CONCEPTIONS, that is to say, as conventional fictions for `
` the purpose of designation and mutual understanding,--NOT for `
` explanation. In "being-in-itself" there is nothing of "casual- `
` connection," of "necessity," or of "psychological non-freedom"; `
` there the effect does NOT follow the cause, there "law" does not `
` obtain. It is WE alone who have devised cause, sequence, `
` reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, `
` motive, and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this `
` symbol-world, as "being-in-itself," with things, we act once more `
` as we have always acted--MYTHOLOGICALLY. The "non-free will" is `
` mythology; in real life it is only a question of STRONG and WEAK `
` wills.--It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in `
` himself, when a thinker, in every "causal-connection" and `
` "psychological necessity," manifests something of compulsion, `
` indigence, obsequiousness, oppression, and non-freedom; it is `
` suspicious to have such feelings--the person betrays himself. And `
` in general, if I have observed correctly, the "non-freedom of the `
` will" is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite `
` standpoints, but always in a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some `
` will not give up their "responsibility," their belief in `
` THEMSELVES, the personal right to THEIR merits, at any price (the `
` vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not `
` wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and `
` owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE `
` BUSINESS, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are `
` in the habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort `
` of socialistic sympathy is their favourite disguise. And as a `
` matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak-willed embellishes `
` itself surprisingly when it can pose as "la religion de la `
` souffrance humaine"; that is ITS "good taste." `
` `
` 22. Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist `
` from the mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of `
` interpretation, but "Nature's conformity to law," of which you `
` physicists talk so proudly, as though--why, it exists only owing `
`