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BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL `
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BY FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE `
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TABLE OF CONTENTS `
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PREFACE `
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BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL `
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CHAPTER I: PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS `
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CHAPTER II: THE FREE SPIRIT `
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CHAPTER III: THE RELIGIOUS MOOD `
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CHAPTER IV: APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES `
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CHAPTER V: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS `
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CHAPTER VI: WE SCHOLARS `
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CHAPTER VII: OUR VIRTUES `
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CHAPTER VIII: PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES `
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CHAPTER IX: WHAT IS NOBLE? `
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FROM THE HEIGHTS (POEM TRANSLATED BY L.A. MAGNUS) `
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PREFACE `
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SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman--what then? Is there not ground `
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for suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they have been `
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dogmatists, have failed to understand women--that the terrible `
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seriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usually `
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paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemly `
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methods for winning a woman? Certainly she has never allowed `
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herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands with `
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sad and discouraged mien--IF, indeed, it stands at all! For there `
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are scoffers who maintain that it has fallen, that all dogma lies `
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on the ground--nay more, that it is at its last gasp. But to `
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speak seriously, there are good grounds for hoping that all `
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dogmatizing in philosophy, whatever solemn, whatever conclusive `
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and decided airs it has assumed, may have been only a noble `
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puerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand when it `
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will be once and again understood WHAT has actually sufficed for `
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the basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as `
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the dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popular `
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superstition of immemorial time (such as the soul-superstition, `
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which, in the form of subject- and ego-superstition, has not yet `
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ceased doing mischief): perhaps some play upon words, a deception `
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on the part of grammar, or an audacious generalization of very `
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restricted, very personal, very human--all-too-human facts. The `
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philosophy of the dogmatists, it is to be hoped, was only a `
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promise for thousands of years afterwards, as was astrology in `
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still earlier times, in the service of which probably more `
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labour, gold, acuteness, and patience have been spent than on any `
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actual science hitherto: we owe to it, and to its "super- `
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terrestrial" pretensions in Asia and Egypt, the grand style of `
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architecture. It seems that in order to inscribe themselves upon `
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the heart of humanity with everlasting claims, all great things `
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have first to wander about the earth as enormous and awe- `
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inspiring caricatures: dogmatic philosophy has been a caricature `
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of this kind--for instance, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia, and `
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Platonism in Europe. Let us not be ungrateful to it, although it `
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must certainly be confessed that the worst, the most tiresome, `
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and the most dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatist `
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error--namely, Plato's invention of Pure Spirit and the Good in `
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Itself. But now when it has been surmounted, when Europe, rid of `
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this nightmare, can again draw breath freely and at least enjoy a `
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healthier--sleep, we, WHOSE DUTY IS WAKEFULNESS ITSELF, are the `
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heirs of all the strength which the struggle against this error `
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has fostered. It amounted to the very inversion of truth, and the `
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denial of the PERSPECTIVE--the fundamental condition--of life, to `
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speak of Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of them; indeed one `
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might ask, as a physician: "How did such a malady attack that `
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finest product of antiquity, Plato? Had the wicked Socrates `
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really corrupted him? Was Socrates after all a corrupter of `
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youths, and deserved his hemlock?" But the struggle against `
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Plato, or--to speak plainer, and for the "people"--the struggle `
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against the ecclesiastical oppression of millenniums of `
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Christianity (FOR CHRISITIANITY IS PLATONISM FOR THE "PEOPLE"), `
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produced in Europe a magnificent tension of soul, such as had not `
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existed anywhere previously; with such a tensely strained bow one `
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can now aim at the furthest goals. As a matter of fact, the `
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European feels this tension as a state of distress, and twice `
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attempts have been made in grand style to unbend the bow: once by `
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means of Jesuitism, and the second time by means of democratic `
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enlightenment--which, with the aid of liberty of the press and `
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newspaper-reading, might, in fact, bring it about that the spirit `
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would not so easily find itself in "distress"! (The Germans `
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invented gunpowder-all credit to them! but they again made things `
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square--they invented printing.) But we, who are neither Jesuits, `
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nor democrats, nor even sufficiently Germans, we GOOD EUROPEANS, `
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and free, VERY free spirits--we have it still, all the distress `
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of spirit and all the tension of its bow! And perhaps also the `
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arrow, the duty, and, who knows? THE GOAL TO AIM AT. . . . `
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Sils Maria Upper Engadine, JUNE, 1885. `
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CHAPTER I `
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PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS `
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1. The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardous `
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enterprise, the famous Truthfulness of which all philosophers `
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have hitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Will `
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to Truth not laid before us! What strange, perplexing, `
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questionable questions! It is already a long story; yet it seems `
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as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last `
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grow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away? That `
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this Sphinx teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? WHO is `
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it really that puts questions to us here? WHAT really is this `
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"Will to Truth" in us? In fact we made a long halt at the `
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question as to the origin of this Will--until at last we came to `
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an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We `
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inquired about the VALUE of this Will. Granted that we want the `
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truth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? `
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The problem of the value of truth presented itself before us--or `
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was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us `
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is the Oedipus here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a `
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rendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could it `
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be believed that it at last seems to us as if the problem had `
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never been propounded before, as if we were the first to discern `
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it, get a sight of it, and RISK RAISING it? For there is risk in `
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raising it, perhaps there is no greater risk. `
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2. "HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For `
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example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will `
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to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the `
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pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such `
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genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse `
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than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different `
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origin, an origin of THEIR own--in this transitory, seductive, `
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illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, `
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they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in `
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the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself-- `
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THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!"--This mode of `
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reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians `
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of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the `
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back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" of `
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theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for `
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something that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The `
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fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES `
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OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt `
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here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most `
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necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUS `
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DUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses `
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exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and `
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antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their `
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seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely `
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provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some `
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corner, perhaps from below--"frog perspectives," as it were, to `
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borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the `
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value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the `
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unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more `
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fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to `
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pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. `
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It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of `
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those good and respected things, consists precisely in their `
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being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil `
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and apparently opposed things--perhaps even in being essentially `
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identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself `
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with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation one must `
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await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will `
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have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto `
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prevalent--philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every sense `
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of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new `
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philosophers beginning to appear. `
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3. Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read `
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between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the `
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greater part of conscious thinking must be counted among the `
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instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of `
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philosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew, as one `
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learned anew about heredity and "innateness." As little as the `
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act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and `
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procedure of heredity, just as little is "being-conscious" `
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OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater `
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part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly `
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influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. `
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And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, `
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there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological `
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demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life For `
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example, that the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that `
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illusion is less valuable than "truth" such valuations, in spite `
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of their regulative importance for US, might notwithstanding be `
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only superficial valuations, special kinds of maiserie, such as `
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may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves. `
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Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the "measure of `
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things." `
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4. The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: `
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it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. `
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